France Strategic Review 2022

The last few years have brought tragedy back into our lives and questioned the destiny of our nation. Exacerbated revisionist ambitions, uninhibited opportunism, the health and climate crises and the return of high-intensity warfare on European soil remind us of the profound interdependence between the national and international scenes, in the food, economic and energy fields. The question of our sovereignty and resilience in an interdependent world takes on a new twist.

Since 2017, France has chosen to reinvest in its armies, to deploy a French and European strategy of sovereignty in the face of an upheaval in global balances. The last two years have accelerated and intensified the transformations.

The fracturing of the world order brings with it challenges and risks that we must address if we are to retain our freedom. Faced with this phenomenon of globalised hybrid warfare, I therefore wanted a national approach in continuity with and in addition to the European Union’s strategic compass adopted under the French Presidency, and the NATO strategic concept launched at our request in 2019, which was also adopted this year.

Our findings and conclusions from 2017 remain relevant. We were not mistaken, so there is continuity in our vision, but continuity does not mean inertia in the face of an history that is hardening and accelerating. The time has come for a more comprehensive mobilisation to better equip us in all respects for the historic challenges of a world where strategic competition and confrontation are merging. It is a question of refining our analyses in order to draw operative conclusions.

By 2030, I want France to have consolidated its role as a balancing, united, radiant, influential power, a driving force for European autonomy and one that assumes its responsibilities by contributing, as a reliable and supportive partner, to the preservation of multilateral mechanisms based on international law.

The conclusions of the National Strategic Review make it possible to increase the independence and strength of our Nation in the new strategic context in which we live.

Emmanuel MACRON

Strategic Analysis

Assessment of the strategic environment

1) Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 represents a strategic shift. On the one hand, combined with other structural developments, it confirms the observation of changes in the threat assessment described in the 2017 national defence and security strategic review, updated in 2021. On the other, it calls for an adaptation of our strategic response to build up our moral strength and resilience, consolidate our alliances and accelerate the modernisation of our defence mechanisms.

2) Confirmation. As described in the 2017 strategic review, increased strategic competition, the weakening of the tools of the collective security architecture, the effects of intimidation or aggressive strategies, combining military and non-military actions, manipulation of information, and even nuclear threats for the purpose of intimidation, have become apparent to the world, and particularly to our fellow citizens. The disinhibition of global and regional powers pursuing revisionist agendas and opportunistic military policies is combined with a growing trend towards isolationism or identity-based withdrawal. In addition, the consequences of proliferation, technological or otherwise, and the persistence of the terrorist threat also remain prevalent. Other major global challenges likely to cause significant imbalance must be added to this picture, such as the impact of climate change: access to water, food insecurity, migration, demography, pandemics, etc.

3) This observation requires us to rapidly adapt our global response, to accelerate our efforts to promote the emergence of a common and shared conception of European defence, as well as of its strategic autonomy, to modernise our national defence mechanisms, and to boost our moral strength, resilience and alliances. The war in Ukraine further justifies the decision of the President of France, made in 2017, to modernise our defence mechanisms.

4) Consolidation. We must continue the efforts made while also accelerating, adapting and completing our strategic posture in the face of threats that are changing in pace, nature and space. Without replacing terrorism or crisis-management threats, these threats are part of a framework that is increasingly marked by the high intensity of potential confrontation between conventional forces and so-called “hybrid” (cyber, digital and space attacks) or — access denial strategies that challenge our interests (exploitation of the vulnerabilities of logistics flows or infrastructure, air and sea spaces).

5) By strengthening its resilience, by giving itself the means to move towards a war economy, by adapting the areas in which it is present according to its strategic interests and by pivoting towards conflict in new areas and of high intensity, France takes a global approach to entirely fulfil its role as a balancing power and to promote a stable international order based on the respect of the law and on multilateralism. It also intends to support the strengthening of the sovereignty of its partners in order to enhance the stability and security of the regions concerned.

6) This observation makes it all the more necessary to pursue our efforts to promote the emergence and implementation of a common and shared conception of European defence, as well as of its strategic autonomy, complementary to our active participation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and our various partnerships, while guarding against the side effects of the sometimes changing strategic or geographical priorities of these allies.

7) Objectives. While they do not call into question the strategic analysis that has prevailed since 2017, the acceleration of the overall deterioration of our environment and the war in Ukraine nevertheless justify a reassessment of the current military programming law based adjusted and structuring strategic objectives (SO) described in this national strategic review.

8) First, the fundamentals remain: France is and will remain a power with a robust and credible nuclear deterrent [SO no. 1], a structural asset for strategic dialogue and for the protection of our vital interests.

9) At the other end of the spectrum, what sustains our model and gives it credibility is our moral strength: that of the French people, namely, that of a united and resilient France [SO no. 2], that of an economy capable of turning itself into a war economy [SO no. 3], that of leading cyber resilience [SO no. 4], which are the conditions that underpin national sovereignty.

10) However, our weight in the world cannot be based on the principle of sovereignty alone. The principle of solidarity is essential, all the more so in a deteriorated context. France wants to be an exemplary and demanding ally within the Euro-Atlantic area [SO no. 5] while also being one of the driving forces for European strategic autonomy [SO no. 6] and a reliable partner in its diplomatic defence relations and, a credible provider of security [SO no. 7].

11) Influence has been given a strategic function. This new function, now an essential part of the expression of power, is a key element of our ability to promote France’s interests and counter the actions of our competitors across the entire spectrum of hybridity.

12) Supporting deterrence and backed by our moral strength, in support of our alliances and partnerships, our military capabilities enable us to have an operational impact that benefits our defence. Our military capabilities are based on sovereign capabilities, autonomy of assessment and appreciation — an essential step that gives meaning to acts and intentions —, anticipation and decision-making [SO no. 8], a willingness and ability to act in hybrid fields in the face of increasingly aggressive strategies and the will to bypass our competitors [SO no. 9], as well as a proven ability to conduct high-intensity military operations in extensive areas of conflict [SO no. 10].

13) Perspectives. The strategic objectives thus described serve to structure a project, both political and military, for the development of the army model which will form part of the future programming law.

14) This national strategic review explains the underlying factors that guide the work on reassessing the military programming law that is currently in progress. It offers an action-oriented consideration of the changes necessary in terms of, for example, moral strength, the resilience of the Nation through National Service (SNU), the war economy and with regard to the future armed forces model. Finally, it enables the principles on which these changes will be transcribed into the next military programming law (2024-2030) to be established.

1. A WORLD OF RENEWED TENSION

1.1 FROM STRATEGIC COMPETITION TO STRATEGIC CONFRONTATION

15) Identified in the 2017 national defence and security strategic review and then in the 2021 strategic update as a long-term trend, the renewal of the phenomenon of strategic competition is now taking place at both a global and a regional level, in configurations that expose us more visibly and are becoming more widespread. Revisionist ambitions have intensified, giving rise to numerous displays of uninhibited opportunism from the eastern Mediterranean to the Sahel and the Pacific. We are thus moving from latent competition to open confrontation on the part of Russia and, increasingly, to greater competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The pandemic, the climate crisis, the migration crises and the return of a high-intensity war on European soil remind us of the far-reaching interdependence between the national and international arenas, in the areas of politics, economics, energy and food. These crises illustrate how the fracturing of the world order can restrict our freedom of action. The 2022 national strategic review is therefore in line with and complementary to the European Union’s strategic compass and NATO’s strategic concept, which were adopted this year. It aims to apply these strategies while integrating our national characteristics.

16) The practice of challenging and circumventing the international order, based on multilateralism and the rule of law, whether reflected in the United Nations, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) or in the reactivation of territorial disputes, is becoming more commonplace and diverse, and follows in the footsteps of past breaches (Helsinki principles, INF and Open Skies treaties, Budapest Memorandum, etc.). The body of agreements and laws built since the end of the Cold War is crumbling and, although the causes are not recent, this phenomenon has accelerated sharply since 2014. By way of illustration, out of the agreements that until recently maintained a balance in the Euro-Atlantic area, only the New START Treaty remains; furthermore, it is due to expire in 2026 without a clear successor. Bypassed and hollowed out if not denounced head-on, this arms control architecture is now more necessary and more weakened than at any time in almost forty years.

1.2 CRYSTALLISATION OF THE MAIN ANTAGONISMS

Russia: assumed revisionist ambitions

17) Russia is pursuing a strategy that seeks to undermine European security, of which the war against Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022, is the most open and brutal manifestation. During the implementation of its ambition of power conceived as an opposition to what Russia calls “the collective West”, Moscow had for a long time privileged a more indirect approach, focusing on undermining the West on a politico-diplomatic level: information warfare and interference, types of action whose perpetrator is difficult to name, search for transatlantic division, etc. Without having disappeared, this strategy is now accompanied by a desire to engage in a direct military confrontation, materialised by the war of aggression against Ukraine. Rewriting history and the national narrative, the Russian government is increasingly open about its imperial ambitions based on a balance-of-power approach.

18) The future of Russian military power after this ordeal will be an important issue for the Atlantic alliance and Europe over the coming decades, as the strategic concept adopted at the Madrid summit and the strategic compass adopted under the French presidency of the Council of the EU (FPCEU) strongly underline. Regardless of the outcome of the war, it will have seriously debilitated the human and material potential of the Russian forces. The need to regenerate this potential will come up against the effects of sanctions on the Russian economy and defence technological and industrial base (DTIB), but should continue to be financed to a large extent. The weakening of its conventional forces over the long term could lead Moscow to privilege more indirect modes of confrontation while boosting the role of its non-conventional weapons in its strategy.

19) In light of the split caused by the war and the irreversibility of Russia’s strategic choices, it is necessary to anticipate a confrontation with Moscow based on the trio of competition, challenge and confrontation, taking place over a long period of time, in multiple regions and spaces. This move towards confrontation is already taking place in Africa, through offensive diplomatic manoeuvres combined with anti-Western information-based attacks and the use of mercenaries. Moscow sees in this globalised hybrid war substantial leverage in external theatres and in environments where new types of action are now being taken. Thus, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Baltic area, the Balkans, and the North Atlantic, but also Africa and the Middle East, offer the possibility of prolonged confrontation and the risk of incidents that could escalate.

People’s Republic of China: the affirmation

20) In addition to staying in power, the goal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is still to supplant the United States as the world’s leading power. Considering American power and the Western model to be in decline, the Chinese regime believes that Western leadership of the international order has weakened and that it can weaken it further by using its new influence. The CCP is therefore banking on the passivity of a majority of non-Western countries over the war in Ukraine to fuel a discourse that portrays an opposition based on “the West against the rest”. However, beyond ideology and the war in Ukraine, such questioning irrigates fields which are political (propaganda on the decline of the West), economic and technological (predation, trade war), military (growth of the nuclear arsenal, modernisation of the PLA, areas of support abroad) and diplomatic (a more assertive attitude in international forums, recourse to a bilateral balance of power or to alternative multilateral formats, such as the 14+1 or the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) in nature.

21) The modernisation of China’s military apparatus continues and enables the PLA to support an increasingly assertive strategy, including on the military front, whether in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly with regard to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, or in other regions of the world where Chinese diplomacy calls to clients, especially in Africa. The political nature of the PLA and the civil-military integration deployed in the technological, economic and information fields enable an unprecedented scope of hybrid actions. The latter is only constrained in practice and, at this stage, by the PRC’s decision to challenge the international security architecture from the inside.

22) The growing strategic convergence between the PRC and Russia opens up the prospect of greater contestation within international bodies, directed against the expression of Western objectives and offering opportunities for political alignment against the West and the United States in particular. The common desire to set aside or silence differences in order to challenge Western influence, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine, gives rise to occasional forms of cooperation. This situation is primarily visible at the diplomatic level and in information warfare. On a structural level, the imbalance in China-Russia relations in favour of Beijing is set to grow with the Ukrainian crisis. The political, strategic and technological implications could be enormous for global governance.

23) Examining Western cohesion and the impact of sanctions against and embargoes on Russia over time will also provide the PRC with a valuable insight into the scope of economic coercion methods that could be used against it in a major crisis.

1.3 CONTESTED AND WEAKENED DEMOCRACIES IN THE BATTLE FOR INFLUENCE

24) In a context of increasingly intense strategic competition and confrontation, the position of liberal democracies has been weakened because they defend an international order whose foundations (international law, multilateralism, values, etc.) are openly challenged by several states. This dynamic is sustained by resentment towards political legacies, sometimes colonial, and perceptions of unfair development, which dovetail with the consolidation of authoritarianism and illiberal regimes around the world. These dynamics make it more difficult to understand the changing environment of our operations and to anticipate crises.

25) This situation manifests itself in the fields of influence and perception. Russian and Chinese operations in these areas seek to undermine our own political systems and national cohesion, while fuelling or even creating alignments against us, as the war in Ukraine demonstrates. Our opponents are counting on the discrediting of Western discourse based on humanist values, and asymmetry in the relationship with laws and in the respect for international humanitarian law.

26) Our competitors use the law as a weapon against our interests to ensure their ascendancy. A tool of hybridity, the strategic use of laws (or lawfare) can be broken down into three major areas: the growing instrumentalisation by certain states of their own laws, in particular through extraterritoriality; the use, misuse or circumventing of international laws; and the exploitation of legal and judicial vulnerabilities resulting from our domestic laws or European commitments.

27) Finally, Western states must consider the inevitability of technological catch-up and dissemination, which are now taking place. This form of technological equalisation helps to make numbers important again. By sometimes taking a more agile approach and having larger volumes, our strategic competitors have the capacity to tip the regional balance, such as Iran in the ballistics field. At the same time, multilateral regimes that fight against dissemination have become less effective, undermined from the inside by Russia in most cases. GAFAM, or other private players, are emerging as non-state players whose active or passive contribution must be included as input data as from the challenge phases.

1.4 CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RETURN OF NUCLEAR REALITY, HIGH INTENSITY AND HYBRIDITY

28) Initial lessons from the war in Ukraine are characterised, in particular, by the threat of nuclear escalation and its trivialisation by a nuclear-weapon state. Combined with the collapse of arms control architecture and the persistence of proliferation crises, Russia’s use of nuclear rhetoric for offensive purposes in support of the invasion of Ukraine has the potential to undermine strategic balances and, in the longer term, to exacerbate proliferation. A successful coercive manoeuvre backed by nuclear weapons would set a dangerous precedent. Russian intimidation and threats of coercion under the shadow of nuclear weapons also undermine the efforts of the P5 states in the area of doctrinal transparency.

29) The next-generation war waged by Russia is characterised by a return to an integral strategy combining far-reaching hybrid actions and high-intensity operations. The lessons of this major engagement under the nuclear umbrella of the aggressor underline the importance of perfect multi-domain operations, known as the multi-environment and multi-field manoeuvre (M2MC), as well as the need for joint action that is significant in terms of its mass and density. They also remind us of the need to create an international approach to strategic competition, allowing us to signal our determination, to prevent and channel the escalation options of competitors operating under different constraints and in different registers from our own.

30) Nuclear multipolarity that has been relatively contained until now, could take a more deregulated form. This is due, in particular, to the undermining of the international frameworks and security guarantees, the expansion pathways of already established nuclear powers and the emboldening of regional players. On the one hand, the quantitative and qualitative growth of China’s nuclear arsenal, combined with Russia’s actions, could jeopardise further efforts to preserve nuclear arms control agreements governing the arsenals of the main holders. On the other, aside from the cases of North Korea and Iran, the non-proliferation regime could be subject to renewed tension. The proliferation of their delivery systems (ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, etc.), a hardening of military postures and the development of access denial capabilities will provide many regional powers with greater capacity to cause harm.

31) Hybrid strategies have shown their impact on multiple theatres. Their effects continue to spread in Africa, the central and eastern Mediterranean, and the Indo-Pacific region. These strategies exploit the difficulty for Western states to provide an effective response that is compatible with respect for the political commitments, treaties and principles that underpin the international order. Using a variety of levers, they are adapted to the geography of the interests of the players implementing them, enabling these players to affect France’s interests at the lowest possible cost, in mainland France and its overseas territories, and abroad. Common spaces (cyber, space, seabed and, air and sea) are now the subject of a renewed competition for power. The actions that have already been taken in these spaces reflect the appropriation by all states of an approach that is applied to these spaces on the basis of the entire trio of competition, challenge and confrontation. Their operational and geographic importance is growing while the common rules governing them are insufficient, weakened or contested.

32) In terms of hybridity, states are increasingly systematically using cyber as a weapon to defend their strategic interests or in the context of geopolitical tension. In addition to the development of offensive capabilities, sophisticated off-the-shelf, cyber-espionage weapons and tools are gradually being developed by private companies. This cyber-arms race increases the risk of escalation, the stages of which are not equally understood. Finally, cybercrime, a threat that has reached an unprecedented level of sophistication and disinhibition, constitutes a strategic challenge for our national security.

1.5 CRISIS AREAS AND REGIONAL OPPORTUNISM

33) The refocusing of the United States on the strategic competition with the PRC is accompanied by a shake-up in the balance of power between regional powers. In the Near and Middle East, the diplomatic and military emboldening of certain regional powers is concomitant with the destabilisation of already fragile countries. The persistence of proliferation crises (Iran, North Korea, Syria in the case of chemical weapons) helps fuel these sources of regional destabilisation. These dynamics affect our strategic interests because they are accompanied by a rearrangement of intra-regional agreements, alliances and power relations. The distrust of the West and the laws it promotes provides the basis for Russia’s and the PRC’s policies of influence in Africa and the Near and Middle East. Within Europe itself, the Western Balkans are likely to be an area of fragility in the short term which these countries may seek to exploit to divide and weaken Europe.

34) The international jihadist movement will continue to spread and pose a security challenge for the next decade, both for the West and for the fragile countries of the Muslim world, from Africa to Southeast Asia. Exploiting favourable conditions (poor governance, endemic corruption, lack of social justice, strategic competition), it will help fuel areas of crisis and destabilisation in the Levant, North Africa, the Sahel and West Africa, for which a military response, in support of local partners, will continue to be sought.

35) The war in Ukraine is also a reminder of how regional crises and global challenges can interact and reinforce each other. Energy has once again become a key issue and a geostrategic lever. The — potentially changing — geography of producers and supply routes fuels energy rivalries that redraw the balance of power. The strategic nature of energy flows complicates the challenges of resource management as many terminals and pipelines (gas and oil) are located in areas of tension. Similarly, the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have highlighted the importance of food as a lever of influence and coercion for certain regimes. Food security has re-emerged as a domestic political stability imperative for many states. The acceleration of the effects of global warming, possibly coupled with a global food crisis, will exacerbate migration phenomena, manipulated or not, and create new areas of tension, likely to weigh on both Western cohesion and each country. Our overseas territories will be increasingly exposed to the security consequences of these underlying trends (increased predation, more violent and destructive natural disasters, migration pressure, etc.), which may require a greater commitment from the armed forces.

36) The war in Ukraine also poses the risk of a return to state terrorism. It may be assumed that given Russia’s uninhibited actions, weapons of all kinds are being recovered in the Ukrainian theatre to serve proxy or terrorist groups. These weapons could be used against our interests, alongside a disinformation campaign.

2. STRATEGIC SOLIDARITY FACED WITH THE CHALLENGE OF CONFRONTATION

37) The acceleration of the risk of conflict and the rapid expansion of the fields of confrontation confirm the need for strategic alliances and the principle of solidarity that structures them. This strategic solidarity must be assessed according to whether France is the beneficiary, the sole provider or one of its components, whether within the EU, NATO or ad hoc coalitions, for example against Daech or in the Sahel-Saharan strip.

38) The deterioration of the international environment, the risk of opportunistic strategies in the face of the stretching of our interests and the diversity of areas of action highlight the immense difficulty for France to respond alone to all the challenges (Eastern and Northern Europe, Mediterranean-Red Sea, Near and Middle East, Indo-Pacific, Africa, Arctic, etc.). The robustness of our partnerships, the maintenance of a high level of interoperability with the United States, and our ability to build permanent or temporary strategic alignments in a changing environment will more surely condition our global influence and our weight in the development of a more stable environment. They will also allow us to anticipate — and thus prevent — potential side effects of competition, or even rivalry between allies.

2.1 EUROPE AT A CROSSROADS TO BECOME A STRATEGIC PLAYER

39) A great deal of progress has been made in recent years in the field of European defence, both in the area of capabilities — creation of the European Defence Fund (EDF), implementation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), strengthening of the European Capability Development Plan — and in the operational area with the creation of the European Peace Facility, or in the social area with the handling of migratory crises.

40) The adoption of an ambitious strategic compass in March 2022 is a first step, symbolising a shared desire to strengthen coherence in defining and pursuing our strategic objectives. Its implementation will be key to strengthening the Union’s capacity to act by 2030, in particular in the operational area and in contested strategic spaces. Furthermore, the lifting of Denmark’s opt-out from the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a positive signal.

41) The development of a real politico-military action capability for Europe in its immediate environment remains an objective. In terms of capabilities, the decisions taken at the Versailles summit (10 and 11 March 2022) have made it possible to launch a new effort, which must be pursued with all European partners. A great deal of work will have to be done to continue to develop a common strategic culture, which is essential for the emergence of a European defence. The joint declaration of 21 September 2021 on a European strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and the adaptation of the European maritime system in the north-west Indian Ocean have the long-term objective of establishing the EU as a credible player and provider of maritime safety and security to the States of the region. This dynamic is already at work in the Arabian Gulf (EMASoH/AGENOR) and the Eastern Mediterranean (QUAD MEDOR).

42) Deepening cooperation between the EU and NATO will be essential to further strengthen European strategic autonomy and the transatlantic relationship.

43) Finally, our cooperation efforts on a European scale have been intensified, by focusing on a wider range of partners with whom large-scale sectoral cooperation has been launched, whether in terms of capabilities, operations or through the establishment of strategic partnerships.

2.2 AN ATLANTIC ALLIANCE STRENGTHENED IN THE CONTEXT

44) NATO remains today the foundation and essential framework for Europe’s collective security. For the majority of our European partners, this observation is made with renewed force by the return of war to the continent and the open and lasting confrontation with Russia, as shown by Finland’s and Sweden’s applications for membership.

45) The period opened in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the maintenance of a conflict in the Donbass, tangible signals of growing Russian military aggression, which forced NATO to make a major effort to adapt. This collective awareness has manifested itself in increased investment, with a third of allies reaching or exceeding 2% of GDP in their defence budgets. This significant effort must be continued as part of a collective increase in power against opponents who unapologetically pursue their own interests. This development is beneficial in that it brings our European partners closer to our view that we must collectively take more responsibility for defence.

2.3 THE AMERICAN PIVOT

46) For the United States, the PRC is the long-term strategic priority, with a fundamental shift starting in 2007. This focus permeates many areas of US policy, relations with traditional allies and its positioning in multilateral forums.

47) Washington is perceived as being in search of a formula that will allow it to reduce its involvement in regional theatres that it now considers secondary (Africa, Middle East), while strengthening the security of its partners. This objective involves, for example, an effort to promote more integrated Middle Eastern partners (Abraham Accords) and to formalise agreements in ad hoc formats around energy, political and military projects (e.g. Pacific Islands Forum). This repositioning is already prompting states in the region to invest in managing their own security.

48) Through the war in Ukraine, the United States has again emerged as the main provider of European security, through the scale of its reassurance efforts and military support to Ukraine. A potential weakening of US investment in areas of European interest (Africa, Middle East), which are more exposed to the unilateral aims of middle powers and the rise of anti-Western views, could affect our ability to make a lasting contribution to the security and stability of these regions.

2.4 OUR PARTNERSHIPS TO BE REINVENTED

49) France, a balanced power, refuses to be locked in bloc geopolitics. It is important to maintain this long-standing and authentic position in the search for a balanced relationship with our allies. France has a long history of establishing strategic partnerships in its areas of interest, in which our partners must find security, stability and development.

50) In Africa, we face major security and humanitarian challenges. The terrorist threat remains high in the Sahel-Saharan strip and is spreading towards the Gulf of Guinea. Russian actors, including the private military company Wagner, are carrying out actions that are contrary to our interests, while their involvement results in a deterioration of the security situation, the predation of economic resources, numerous abuses documented by the UN and the ever-greater fragility of the states that resort to them. The PRC has a stranglehold on infrastructure, the economy and debt, creating risks of dependency of our partners, as well as of espionage and restrictions on our operating environment.

51) With the Latin American and Indo-Pacific regions, France can strengthen its cooperation and consolidate the relations of our overseas departments, regions and communities with their immediate environment.

52) The ability of certain competitors to propose alternative models, most often based on a transactional approach and less governed by normative concerns, also has an impact, particularly on states under political, economic or food pressure.

Challenges

Reminder of national security interests and confirmation of strategic functions

53) France’s interests include all factors that contribute to its security, prosperity and influence. In particular, a distinction should be made between:

• the protection of the national territory, including the overseas territories, and of French nationals against external threats and attempts at internal destabilisation, including the terrorist threat;

• the security of the EU Member States and the euro-atlantic area under the treaties by which we are bound;

• the stability of our neighbourhood, given the immediate repercussions that any crisis emerging there would have on our own territory, both metropolitan and overseas;

• freedom of access to common spaces (cyber, space, seabed, air-sea spaces, and the poles), which is now threatened by challenges to the rules-based international order and by approaches based on power.

54) Defending these interests is now more complex because of the more systematic use of force and intimidation by some of our strategic competitors, and because of an international context that has been permanently damaged by the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

55) France’s main lever for achieving this remains the long-term maintenance of its autonomy of decision and sovereign action in the face of all the threats that arise. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the world’s seventh largest economy controlling the second largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ), a nuclear-weapon state, and a founding member and driver of European integration, France has essential tools to assert its interests on the international stage.

56) However, the increasing number of constraints on our interests makes it more necessary than ever to have robust and sustainable means of action, adapted to recent developments in the world. Our defence apparatus contributes to this on several levels, as the basis of our independence and freedom of action in the world in the face of threats of all kinds.

57) In this respect, the policies defined in 2013 and 2017 remain fully valid and their concrete implementation must be continued and accelerated.

58) They establish that the defence of our security interests rests on three pillars: the strengthening of our strategic autonomy; the achievement of European sovereignty and the consolidation of our alliances; the preservation of a stable international order, based on respect for the law and multilateralism.

59) In any case, it remains the ultimate responsibility of the President of the Republic to constantly assess the nature of our interests and the attacks that could be made on them.

1. FRANCE’S SECURITY PRIORITIES

1.1 STRENGTHENING OUR STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

60) Strategic autonomy is the sine qua non condition for the protection of our fundamental interests. At its core are the capacities for autonomous assessment, decision making and action.

61) Our freedom of action and the protection of our fundamental interests are ensured first and foremost by the credibility of nuclear deterrence, the keystone of our defence strategy. The fundamental aim of deterrence is to prevent a major war that would threaten the survival of the nation by protecting France against any state-sponsored aggression against its vital interests and against any attempt at blackmail. In a more uncertain and complex world, where some countries are on a worrying trajectory of opacity and rapid growth of their nuclear arsenals, or even raise the spectre of using the weapon for intimidation or blackmail, maintaining the credibility of our deterrent over the long term remains essential.

62) Our autonomy also depends on the strengthening of a credible, coherent and balanced armed forces model. This requires conventional forces whose size and equipment allow for a conventional-nuclear linkage that is sufficiently robust to preserve the President’s freedom of action and avoid a circumvention of deterrence from below.

63) Strategic autonomy is also based on other factors: national cohesion, economic and industrial independence, securing our supplies, and international influence, particularly through strong diplomacy.

1.2 THE ACHIEVEMENT OF EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF OUR ALLIANCES

64) The protection and promotion of our fundamental interests cannot be limited to the national level. We must continue to contribute actively to the defence of European interests and our collective security. These objectives require the strengthening of our international cooperation, partnerships and alliances, first and foremost within the EU and NATO, where we are bound by certain security guarantees (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and Article 42-7 of the EU Treaty). Investing in ad hoc partnerships, already existing or to be created, will also allow us to forge common responses to certain challenges according to specific geographies.

65) Beyond these commitments, our interests must be seen in light of the growing interweaving of the interests of European states, united in a common destiny. The return of approaches based on power and war to the European continent illustrates the importance of continuing and deepening integration among Europeans in order to foster:

• the development of a common strategic culture in all fields (extension of the work undertaken in the 2022 strategic plan);

• the ability of Europeans to defend their security interests against potential aggression, in particular in their immediate neighbourhood, including through the development of common defence capabilities allowing for greater interoperability;

• joint European action in support of the international order based on law and multilateral management of global issues (United Nations, non-proliferation regimes, etc.);

• the affirmation of the EU as a geopolitical actor.

1.3 THE DEFENCE OF A STABLE INTERNATIONAL ORDER BASED ON THE RULE OF LAW AND MULTILATERALISM

66) In addition to our commitments to our EU partners and NATO allies, our interests must also take into account the states in our neighbourhood and those to which we are linked by partnerships or defence agreements. This concerns areas of the world where states are engaging in increasingly aggressive strategic competition, and where non-state groups may be able to directly threaten our citizens.

67) As a balancing power, France has a duty to contribute to the stability and security of these regions. The location of some of our territories in these areas requires us to maintain our presence in all areas and gives us a particular legitimacy to act.

2. EXPANSION OF STRATEGIC FUNCTIONS

68) The various strategic functions to which the armed forces contribute, identified in the 2008 White Paper, have seen their relevance confirmed as the strategic environment has evolved. They cover knowledge-appreciation-anticipation, deterrence, protection-resilience, prevention, intervention, and now influence.

69) Influence, in all its dimensions — diplomatic, military, economic, cultural, sporting, linguistic, informational — is an area of dispute, which requires a coordinated response. It is a new strategic function in its own right.

70) Their proper structuring serves an integrated approach to respond to the evolving continuum of threats posed by our adversaries to our interests and values and those of our closest partners. In this respect, they remain dependent on our ability to ensure good coordination at both European and multilateral level.

2.1 KNOWLEDGE — APPRECIATION — ANTICIPATION

71) The knowledge-appreciation-anticipation function feeds into all the other strategic functions. The maintenance of an autonomous capacity for assessment is a guarantee of sovereign decision making. It contributes directly to understanding the intentions of our competitors. While being a condition for the operational effectiveness of the forces, it contributes to the economy of the resources used.

72) The five areas of this function are intelligence, knowledge of theatres of operation, diplomacy, foresight and anticipation, and information management. The recent crises and breakdowns as well as the extension of conflicts to new areas justify strengthening this function.

73) The effort must focus on understanding the phenomena in order to anticipate and facilitate the reactivity of the decision. Faced with the pace of crises and escalation, but also with the saturation of irrelevant information or information manipulated by our competitors, collective effectiveness depends more and more on the ability to sort, prioritise and circulate intelligence as quickly as possible, in order to understand the phenomena it describes.

74) The knowledge-appreciation-anticipation function has a strong partnership dimension. In order to maintain an autonomous assessment of the situation on priority issues, France must also rely on the assessment of its partners in addition to its own resources.

2.2 DETERRENCE

75) Nuclear deterrence is based on its political, operational and technical credibility. In order to be solid, this credibility must continue to be based on an in-depth strategic culture, dynamic and cutting-edge scientific research, technical and operational know-how that is constantly maintained, strong industrial sovereignty, and understanding of the issues by our fellow citizens.

76) The purpose of deterrence is to protect us from any state aggression against our vital interests, wherever it comes from and whatever its form, and it remains the ultimate guarantee of the Nation’s security, protection and independence. It ensures our autonomy of decision and freedom of action in the context of our international responsibilities at all times, including against attempts to blackmail us in the event of a crisis. By its existence, it contributes to the security of the Atlantic alliance and to that of Europe.

77) The deterrence assets are being renewed while being maintained at a level of strict sufficiency. They must remain adapted to a wide variety of situations and continue to offer the Head of State a sufficiently wide range of mode of action. To achieve this, deterrence will continue to rely on the airborne and oceanic components. Bringing together three nuclear forces with their own characteristics, they allow, through their complementarity and their differentiated assets, a wide range of options and a high level of flexibility and responsiveness.

2.3 PROTECTION — RESILIENCE

78) The implementation of a strategic function dedicated to protection-resilience is now essential. The notions of protection and resilience complement each other, with resilience being an indispensable prerequisite for ensuring the protection of the French people and the national territory and guaranteeing the continuity of the essential functions of the Nation. This function requires enhanced cooperation with our allies and partners.

79) This protection function primarily concerns the national territory in metropolitan and overseas, as well as areas where French communities are heavily established or exposed abroad. This geographical dimension alone is no longer sufficient to respond to the nation’s vulnerabilities, given the dependence of our economy on strategic supplies and energy flows, as well as the hybrid strategies developed by France’s strategic competitors. The protection-resilience function must also include the new missions induced by the consequences of climate change and the degradation of biodiversity: food when used as a weapon, power and self-sufficiency, protection and security of value chains, assistance to our populations, securing territories and EEZ, considering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats, manipulation of information, etc.

80) All state institutions contribute to the implementation of this function. For their part, the armed forces are permanently engaged on a daily basis to protect the national territory and the French people within the framework of their State action missions at sea or in the air, domestic missions and their own military operations. They ensure permanent air and maritime security postures (PASP and PMSP), which guarantee national sovereignty in air and maritime spaces, and help secure supply and communication routes. These day-to-day measures are reinforced according to the threat or particular events. The resurgence of unfriendly behaviour in our territorial approaches requires robust means of detection, remediation and response, including in space and in cyberspace. The capabilities of the armed forces thus need to be strengthened and structured as part of the overall state effort to deal with large-scale crises.

2.4 PREVENTION

81) Prevention concerns both the national territory and France’s action outside its borders. Its implementation includes both the development of national and international standards and the fight against trafficking and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, for disarmament and peace-building. Supporting the stabilisation of states in crisis contributes to conflict prevention and limits the cost of further intervention. The prevention function is based on a wide range of potential crisis or escalation scenarios, covering the top end of the spectrum and competition between great powers, as well as the manifestations of rapidly changing conflict.

82) The pre-positioning of military forces plays a key role in the exercise of the prevention function, as it does for other strategic functions. The presence of French military forces in third countries, in agreement with them, contributes directly to this objective.

83) The security and defence cooperation mechanism is an indirect lever for preventing future crises. This cooperation takes the form of assistance to allied partner forces to provide them with the capabilities to assert their own sovereignty.

84) The prevention function must be articulated with the intervention function. This articulation is embodied in the capacity to signify determination, clarify intentions and discourage opponents — including in the field of perceptions — to “win the war before the war”.

2.5 INTERVENTION

85) The intervention function serves three purposes: to ensure the protection of our nationals abroad; to defend our priority interests and those of our partners and allies; and to live up to our international responsibilities.

86) It gives France’s security the strategic depth it needs, but also the broader credibility it needs to ensure the reliability of its alliances and its ability to train in coalitions as a framework nation. While French armies retain a capacity to act alone, the normal framework for their engagement outside the territory is that of collective action.

87) In addition to the resources necessary for the protection of the national territory, the armed forces have the capacity to engage in priority areas for the defence and security of France: the European periphery, the area from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, part of Africa — from the Sahel to equatorial Africa — the Arabian Gulf and the Indo-Pacific. France must now resolve the issue of the strategic extension of its forces, and therefore the use of support points to which the pre-positioned forces, the overseas sovereignty forces and its strategic partnerships are attached.

88) The intervention function cannot be separated from the other functions, especially in a high-intensity engagement. Whether it is the knowledge-appreciation-anticipation function (anticipating and characterising threats to allow a wide range of options), prevention (the value of signalling our active deployments), protection-resilience (securing our supply chains) and deterrence (the concept of support between conventional posture and nuclear deterrence), the intervention function translates into multi-location and multi-field actions.

2.6 INFLUENCE

89) The strategic function of influence aims to promote and defend the interests and values of France. This is an essential part of the expression of power. In this respect, France has many assets. It has a major political weight due to its seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), its status as nuclear-weapon state and its overseas presence, a complete army model and troops deployed on many continents, its economic attractiveness, the French language spoken by 300 million people, a positive image due to our cultural influence, global projection supported by the universality of the diplomatic, cultural and educational network, our security partnerships, etc.

90) The new dimension given to the capacity to influence takes note of an acceleration and hardening of competition and contestation in all fields, particularly in that of perceptions. The aggressiveness shown by our competitors reminds us that nothing can be taken for granted: in addition to our diplomatic, economic and strategic interests, the new battles for influence involve our ability to maintain the French and European model and to ensure that France’s commitment on the international stage is understood and accepted. We therefore need to take on the balance of power more directly in this field to defend the national interest.

91) Influence is first and foremost part of a long-term strategy. A global policy conducted and coordinated at the interministerial level, it relies on capacities that support and legitimise our positions and our action, which must be deployed in all possible fields (training of foreign military personnel and coordination of networks, contribution to university research, aid to economic development, etc.). It also requires knowledge of the levers of influence deployed by our partners, competitors and adversaries.

92) Integral to the other strategic functions described in this review, the influence function must be embodied in a national influence strategy.

93) Following on from the 2021 Roadmap for Influence, this national strategy will set the general framework for action by all the actors concerned, determine the intentions and provide guidance for the national sectoral and/or geographical strategies.

94) This strategy will aim to:

• defend France’s long-term interests as well as universal values, the application of international law, multilateralism and the preservation of common goods;

• promote and enhance its commitments in all areas;

• respond or retaliate to manoeuvres or to attacks, particularly in the information field, against our interests.

3. IMPACTS OF THE RECENT CONTEXT ON FRANCE’S SECURITY INTERESTS

95) The return of high intensity conflict, including on European territory, the increasingly unbridled expression of the desire for power on the part of our strategic competitors and the weakening of international regulatory frameworks constrain our choices and pose an unprecedented risk to France’s priority security interests.

96) The attacks on our strategic autonomy are increasing. Our strategic competitors seek to make use of our dependencies, and to undermine our sovereign judgement and national cohesion in order to shape our understanding of situations and constrain our decisions.

97) The achievement of European sovereignty is essential to the defence of our interests, particularly in this period marked by a tendency towards inward-looking isolation that deeply affects the major players in the international community. Our partnerships and alliances are both one of France’s main assets on the international scene and one of the targets favoured by our strategic competitors to weaken us. The COVID-19 pandemic and then the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine have demonstrated the centrality of our partnerships and alliances in developing a common understanding of the challenges and providing appropriate responses. The Strategic Compass for the European Union and the update of NATO’s Strategic Concept set out clear roadmaps, which must now be implemented.

98) The defence of a stable international order, based on the rule of law and multilateralism, has underpinned our security and prosperity since 1945. The activism of revisionist powers and the project they are carrying out, centred on the balance of power and the fait accompli, is not acceptable: our security interests require ensuring the continuity of our strategic supplies, our freedom of action in the common spaces and our sovereignty in the digital space, as well as an ambitious commitment to arms control and non-proliferation. These objectives must be based on collective and respected rules.

General ambition for 2030

99) France affirms its ambition to be a balancing power on the international scene by 2030, having strengthened its influence in its areas of interest. It aims to be a driving force for European strategic autonomy in a Europe capable of facing crises and implementing solutions that guarantee its own security, in particular through a credible European defence that complements the Atlantic alliance. Finally, it fulfils its security responsibilities by aiming to preserve effective multilateral mechanisms based on international law.

100) This strategic ambition must be deployed through the prism of the fracturing of the world order, highlighted in particular by the war in Ukraine. This context calls into question the current French armed-forces model, which was designed according to a logic that was mainly expeditionary. This model in 2030 will have to provide France with the capacity to deal with the need for increased prevention and influence, a possible return to high-intensity interstate conflict, and the hybrid strategies deployed by our competitors.

101) In 2030, France:

• is capable of defending its metropolitan and overseas territory, and of protecting and involving its citizens. This permanent ambition is based on an independent, credible and coherent nuclear deterrent, the keystone of our defence policy, supported by robust conventional armed forces. Permanent security postures adapted to the threats and involving the internal security forces and a dynamic national resilience strategy also contribute to this;

• contributes to the defence of Europe and to stability in the Mediterranean by having the capability to engage in high-intensity conflict. It can assume the role of a framework nation within a NATO, EU or ad hoc coalition;

• acts in the framework of balanced partnerships, providing security, in an area stretching from sub-Saharan Africa to the Arabian Gulf, via the Horn of Africa. Together with its allies, it offers its partner armies a diversified and orchestrated range of courses and training. From a network of suitable support bases, it retains a capacity for intervention or coalition support;

• contributes through its influence and with its partners to the stability of the Indo-Pacific area. In it, it defends its sovereignty and respect for international law;

• ensures its freedom of action in common spaces (cyber, space, seabed, air and sea) and the security of its supply routes, together with its partners.

102) To achieve this, France has set itself ten strategic objectives:

• a robust and credible nuclear deterrent;

• a united and resilient France;

• an economy that contributes to the spirit of defence;

• top-ranked cyber resilience;

• France, an exemplary ally in the Euro-Atlantic area;

• France, one of the drivers of European strategic autonomy;

• France, a partner of reliable sovereignty and credible security provider;

• guaranteed autonomy of assessment and decision-making sovereignty;

• a capacity to defend and act in hybrid fields;

• freedom of action and the ability to conduct military operations, including high-intensity operations, autonomously or in coalition, in all fields.

Ten Strategic Objectives

Strategic objective 1

A robust and credible nuclear deterrent

103) The effectiveness of French deterrence policy depends on its political, operational and technical credibility. This is reflected in a demanding posture and long-term capability commitments, but also in the ability, which has been widely demonstrated since its inception, to adapt both doctrine and resources to the strategic context and its potential changes.

104) France’s deterrence policy must therefore take into account the global trends that are unfolding in the technological field as well as through hybrid forms of conflict: on the one hand, the capability developments of our competitors (air and missile defences, space, hypervelocity weapons, underwater surveillance, etc.) must constantly inform our thinking on deterrence; on the other hand, the modes of hybrid action, already at work in peacetime, are likely to affect the environment — political, normative, informational, etc. — within which deterrence is exercised and must be the subject of constant reflection on the means of countering them.

1. THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF THE FRENCH DETERRENT

105) The conflict in Ukraine is an indication of the essential role our nuclear forces play in the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. It demonstrates the need to maintain a robust and credible nuclear deterrent to prevent a major war, guarantee France’s freedom of action and preserve its vital interests, which have a European dimension.

2. MAINTAINING AN EFFECTIVE, INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN DETERRENT

106) In this context, it is essential to maintain a credible deterrent, i.e. one that is legitimate, effective and independent, for the period to 2030 and beyond.

107) Part of the challenge of preserving the legitimacy of deterrence is to redouble efforts to strengthen the strategic and deterrence culture, both nationally and within the EU and the Alliance, by enabling a wider public to understand deterrence issues.

108) At the same time, in accordance with the principle of strict sufficiency, France will continue its action in favour of arms control, non-proliferation and strategic risk reduction.

109) France has chosen to continue efforts to renew its two components and to ensure that the armed-forces model allows for a sufficiently robust mutual support of nuclear and conventional forces to preserve the freedom of action of the President of the Republic and to avoid circumventing deterrence from below. The war in Ukraine confirms the need to maintain a capacity to understand and constrain the risk of escalation. In addition, building national resilience to all threats will strengthen deterrence.

110) Finally, the independence of the French deterrent must be perpetuated thanks to a reinforced monitoring of the fundamental and applied research teams, of the national industrial fabric linked to the deterrent and to a consolidation of the technical, industrial and operational know-how that is indispensable to it.

Strategic objective 2

A united and resilient France

111) France must strengthen its resilience in the face of all the security challenges it is likely to face, whether military or non-traditional (information manipulation, climate change, resource predation, pandemics, etc.). This effort must be deployed in metropolitan and overseas France, particularly by promoting the spirit of defence and ensuring national cohesion.

1. STRENGTHEN FRANCE’S CAPACITY FOR RESILIENCE, COLLECTIVELY AND IN DEPTH

112) France is implementing its national resilience strategy (NRS). This aims to strengthen its ability to withstand any kind of damage to the normal life of the country. It allows for a precise and efficient connection with several mechanisms with similar objectives, adopted by both the EU and NATO.

113) The NRS defines three fundamental objectives: to prepare the State in depth for crises; to develop human resources and material capacities to deal with them, by including an overall study on the question of strategic stocks and the diversification of supply sources; and to adapt public communication to the challenges of resilience. This strategy must now be extended to local and regional authorities, companies, associations and the public.

2. PROMOTING A SUSTAINABLE SPIRIT OF DEFENCE IN SOCIETY AND THE STATE

114) The individual moral strengths of the citizen, especially our youth, are the foundation of collective resilience. They should be strengthened in the educational field, in order to increase the skills that strengthen the resilience of society (transmission of republican values, first aid, etc.). As part of the interministerial dynamic, the armed forces contribute to the promotion of remembrance and help to spread the spirit of defence among young people. The ministries concerned will mobilise to support the ramping up of the universal national service (UNS) to provide a national pool of resilience. Finally, the overhaul of the reserve system will be undertaken globally beyond the National Guard (army and internal security forces).

115) The attractiveness of the military must be strengthened, by supporting and compensating for the constraints of military life in order to consolidate the spirit of defence, forged as early as possible in the educational sphere, in concrete and rewarding approaches.

116) Military uniqueness, which is essential to enable the armed forces to prepare and ensure the defence of the homeland and the higher interests of the Nation, must be preserved, particularly from the increasing normative pressure.

3. DEVELOP SYNERGY BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ALL SERVICES OF THE STATE

117) The prospect of a major crisis or even a high-intensity confrontation involving France makes it necessary to raise the level of ambition in terms of national resilience, in particular by developing a better understanding of mutual resilience between the armed forces and the nation.

118) The armed forces are able to participate in the management of any major crisis with a high degree of responsiveness within the framework of a strengthened civil-military dialogue. The general economy of Operation Sentinel must be rethought in order to guarantee the freedom of action of the armed forces while responding to new security challenges. A renewal of the Operational Defence of the Territory (ODT) concept will also be undertaken.

119) The commitment of the entire nation must be strengthened by increasing awareness of national defence and security issues among public officials, continuous training of crisis management actors, consolidation of the network of senior defence and security officials (SDSO), and the commitment of all ministries to ensure the support of armed forces engaged in a high intensity conflict.

120) This synergy between a population imbued with the spirit of defence and public actors experienced in planning and crisis management will make it possible to strengthen national resilience in the fields of security, the economy, employment and social cohesion.

Strategic objective 3

An economy contributing to the spirit of defence

121) Setting up an economy that contributes to the spirit of defence requires knowing how to mobilise all the resources of the Nation, in order to transform into a war economy, i.e. to organise itself so that French industry can support a war effort in the long term, in case of necessity for the armed forces or for the benefit of a partner.

1. SECURING CRITICAL SUPPLIES AND MATCHING STOCKS TO PRODUCTION CAPACITY

122) To sustain a war effort over the long term (high consumption of ammunition, attrition, etc.) the best compromise is to be sought by acting on three main levers: the constitution of strategic stocks (complete equipment but also raw materials and critical components); the relocation of the most sensitive production lines; and the diversification of supplies.

123) In addition, joint stocks of components or raw materials could be set up on the initiative and under the responsibility of industry to support military industrial activities in the event of a conflict, or civilian activities in the event of an economic or health crisis. The development of recycling channels should also contribute to a circular economy, reducing the need for supply and contributing to sustainable development.

124) Securing the supply of critical resources could benefit from European initiatives such as the RePowerEU action plan and its variations on raw materials (Raw Material Act) and on components (Chips Act), while respecting French sovereign interests and environmental requirements.

125) In order to ensure the capacity of its government responsibilities, the State must be able to impose priorities or requisitions on the national market, depending on the evolution of the conflict.

126) Since security stability is a condition for the sustainability of our society, the defence technological and industrial base (DTIB) must be able to benefit from favourable financing tools, including in the context of the development of sustainable finance. Thus, future standards for taxonomy or environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria should not discourage investment in defence industry companies.

127) Finally, the health crisis and the Ukrainian conflict have shown the importance of having secure and redundant sources of supply. Thus, the relocation of production and recycling facilities on European and national territory must be encouraged and supported in order to remedy the most critical dependence on materials, components, etc. This is the subject of in-depth work in the context of the work on the war economy.

2. REDUCING PRODUCTION AND SUPPORT CYCLES FOR THE GRADUAL RISE OF THE “WAR ECONOMY”

128) In addition to the acquisition, over the next few years, of the most critical equipment necessary to face a high-intensity conflict or susceptible to rapid attrition, a war economy preparation plan is being developed in order to adapt the DTIB to the different geopolitical contexts in a gradual and adjustable manner.

129) Taking into account these geopolitical contexts must also be reflected in the EU and NATO defence capability tools.

3. IMPLEMENTING REGULATORY, NORMATIVE, PROCUREMENT AND SUPPORT PROCESS SIMPLIFICATIONS FROM A POINT OF VIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT

130) The increasing and proactive use of innovation and value analysis in the work between the Defence procurement agency and the armed forces must enable the forces to be equipped with the most appropriate solutions while taking an acceptable risk in use and achieving the best balance between operational gains, financial gains and time gains.

Strategic objective 4

First-rate cyber resilience

131) In the face of strategic developments, the focus must be on improving our cyber resilience. There is no way to envisage a cyber shield that would thwart any cyber-attack on France, but strengthening its level of cyber security is essential to prepare the country for more threats. Similarly, the application of a deterrent approach in cyberspace that would force any attacker to restrain himself against France is illusory, but adopting response strategies that mobilise all the levers of the State, both European and international, makes it possible to make cyberattacks particularly costly for the attackers.

132) This cyber resilience consists in having adapted and organised capacities, that can prevent or, if necessary, reduce the impact and duration of cyber-attacks against France, at least for the most critical functions.

1. IMPROVING FRANCE’S CYBER RESILIENCE, A CONDITION OF SOVEREIGNTY

133) The efforts undertaken in the public and private sectors must be amplified. Notwithstanding the important work already undertaken, the State’s cybersecurity has significant room for improvement. In some critical sectors, large-scale attacks are still plausible, even if the investments made under the France Recovery plan have considerably improved the level of cyber security. As for the systemic role of certain digital actors, it is still insufficiently taken into account.

2. CONSOLIDATING THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH MODEL

134) The fundamental achievements of the French model, established in 2008 and regularly reinforced and adapted, must be consolidated. The governance of the State’s digital security has been renovated and can now be deployed. The national capacity to design and implement public policies is illustrated by the creation of regional incident response teams (CSIRT), the opening of the Cyber Campus and the emergence of a cyber defence ecosystem in Rennes. Finally, following its presidency of the Council of the European Union, France is recognised by its peers as exemplary on cybersecurity issues. The challenge now is to ensure that the EU directives for mass cybersecurity adopted under the FPEU are implemented as soon as possible.

3. INVESTING OVER THE LONG TERM TO REACH THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF CYBER RESILIENCE

135) The level of cybersecurity of all public services needs to be raised significantly. This will necessarily involve investments to consolidate a homogeneous and secure digital base for the State and to strengthen institutions and administrations that are still too fragile.

136) France’s action must be increased by relying on a dynamic public and private cyber ecosystem. The State cannot act alone on cybersecurity issues and must be able to mobilise all actors in the event of a major crisis. Particular attention will be paid to prevention and to assistance to all victims of malicious cyberattacks. Finally, this ecosystem must be based on a competitive national and European cyber defence industry.

137) All actors in the digital world must be trained and made aware of the cyber risk. The aim is to mobilise the general public, systematically integrate it into educational curricula and strengthen the attractiveness of the professions in the sector. Efforts must also be made to ensure the accountability of digital service providers and the security of supply chains, particularly that of the State. Finally, France can support and encourage the emergence of robust and sovereign trustworthy offers at both national and European level.

138) Lastly, France’s resilience depends on that of its European and international partners and on the security and stability of cyberspace as a whole. It is therefore necessary to contribute to raising the level of resilience of European and international institutions and of France’s partners, as well as to pursue the structuring of a European market for cybersecurity products and services. On the international scene, France must put forward proposals to control the trade and fight against the proliferation of cyber weapons, in particular through better use of export control tools for goods and technologies. In addition, a common standard for cyber crisis management, as well as cooperation and mutual assistance mechanisms, would enable states to avoid the risks of misunderstanding and uncontrolled escalation.

Strategic objective 5

France, an exemplary ally in the Euro-Atlantic area

139) NATO is a political and military alliance that plays a key role in European security through its main mission of collective defence and, in particular, the assistance clause in Article 5 of the 1949 Treaty. The transatlantic link remains essential for the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and consequently that of France.

1. CONTRIBUTING TO INCREASING THE OPERATIONAL ADDED VALUE OF THE ALLIANCE

140) France will continue to contribute fully to all the missions of the Atlantic Alliance, assuming its role within the military structures and operations, as it is doing in the context of the war in Ukraine, in the Baltic States and in Romania. It will contribute to their responsiveness and adaptation.

141) France wishes to confirm the Alliance’s key role in the defence of Europe. NATO strengthens the potential of armies and is the forum for addressing interoperability challenges as well as capability, technological and operational expectations.

2. ENHANCE THE KEY AND UNIQUE ROLE OF FRANCE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

142) France intends to maintain a unique position within the Alliance. It has a demanding and visible position because of the specificity and independence of its defence policy, in particular because of its nuclear deterrent. On the strength of its operational credibility, its unique ability to act urgently at a high level and its financial contribution, which is among the largest in the Alliance, France intends to strengthen its influence and that of the European allies in order to weight with them on the major changes in NATO’s posture and the future of strategic stability in Europe.

143) Concerned about the coherence and cohesion of the Alliance, France will continue to contribute in a proactive, realistic and sustainable way to the strengthening of the posture on the eastern flank — including as a framework nation — and to the adaptation of NATO’s command structure.

3. DRIVING EU-NATO COOPERATION

144) France is working to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance in a pragmatic approach to its role, which excludes an extension to other geographical areas and in particular the Indo-Pacific. The guarantee provided by NATO’s collective defence mission remains the central pillar of security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

145) Defence investment, in line with the 2014 Wales Summit commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence, must continue to increase in Europe. This level should be seen as a floor to match the strategic disruption caused by the war in Ukraine and the capabilities needed by the European allies to ensure their security.

146) This collective effort also involves the creation, at EU level, of the necessary incentives for capability and industrial cooperation between European states. These contribute to the strengthening of the continent’s resilience, which is essential for the Alliance’s effectiveness, but also for the sustainability of a robust, agile European DTIB (EDTIB) capable of meeting the operational needs of European armed forces.

147) France supports a modernisation, widening and deepening of the EU-NATO partnership, to take account of the new security challenges facing Europe and the forthcoming accession of Finland and Sweden.

Strategic objective 6

France, one of the driving forces behind European strategic autonomy

148) France and all European countries share the same security challenges. The adoption of an ambitious strategic compass in March 2022 and the major role played by the EU since the start of the war in Ukraine demonstrate both the power of our levers and the distance we still have to travel. It is necessary to bring about the emergence of a sovereign Europe, endowed with a common strategic culture, with a capacity for evaluation and autonomous action in the service of the shared interests of Europeans.

1. COMING TOGETHER AROUND A EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

149) France plays a key role in strengthening European sovereignty, notably through its triple membership of the EU, NATO and the UNSC.

150) France is first of all working towards a convergence of views in the assessment of situations between Europeans, all of whom have different strategic cultures or political priorities.

151) France then supports the renewal of the European partnership policy initiated with the adoption of the strategic compass. It goes hand in hand with the strengthening of the EU’s defence relations with countries in Africa and the Indo-Pacific and, in the case of the United States and the United Kingdom, with the implementation of balanced relations supported by regular and intensive defence and security dialogues. Increased, sustainable and durable EU-NATO complementarity must be sought. France must play a leading role in this, promoting closer cooperation in certain key areas, such as military mobility, cyber and hybrid threats.

152) Finally, the EU’s cohesion in its support for Ukraine is a priority. It is imperative that Europeans remain united and proactive, both on sanctions and in support of the Ukrainian armed and security forces. The continuation of a high level of military assistance over time through the provision of equipment and appropriate training is crucial. This consistency is necessary for Europe to remain capable of influencing the resolution of the conflict.

2. BRINGING EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES TO THE FORE

153) The EU must continue on the path towards greater technological autonomy which goes hand in hand with the development of the European defence industry.

154) European strategic autonomy depends on robust European defence industrial capabilities that meet its own needs. France supports the setting up of a short-term instrument for the joint acquisition of European equipment. It also supports the creation of a defence investment programme for the joint development and procurement of critical and innovative equipment. The central role of the European Defence Agency (EDA) must be reaffirmed and all existing instruments must be mobilised: the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Coordinated Annual Defence Review (CARD), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Hub for European Defence Innovation (HEDI). In addition, the provisions related to the social taxonomy must consider the specificity and needs of the EDTIB, which is a central component of European strategic autonomy.

155) These efforts must be accompanied by structural and decisive progress in common capability projects with the objective of an independent EDTIB and common choices among Europeans.

3. STRENGTHENING THE EU’S AND EUROPEANS’ OWN CAPACITY TO ACT

156) Europe must be supported in its role as a global player, a credible defender of free access to contested spaces (sea, space, cyber, air, seabed) in the face of the hybrid strategies of its competitors. With the right strategies and capabilities, it is able to protect the citizens of the Member States, to interact and, where necessary, to intervene on all continents in strict compliance with the law.

157) The Union’s normative power must be exploited as a lever of influence in a more competitive environment, in order to guard against hybrid threats and other forms of foreign interference, be it “lawfare”, commodity blackmail or information manipulation.

158) In this sense, France supports the instruments developed by the European institutions: hybrid toolbox, foreign information manipulation and interference — FIMI — toolbow, anti-economic coercion regulation, etc.

159) France is contributing to the development of a genuine EU STRATCOM, capable of positioning Europe and European action in relation to its citizens, their representatives, our partners and also our competitors.

160) The EU must continue to build up its rapid deployment capability. It needs to be able to respond quickly and more robustly in less permissive environments. To this end, France is promoting more flexible decision-making with Article 44 of the EU Treaty and renewed decision-making and control structures (C2), as well as global mandates to act on a broad spectrum: advice, training, equipment, combat support. The Union must have the capacity to mobilise ad hoc formats when necessary, as France has already done with Takuba or EMASoH.

161) France, given its geographical position, its industrial and military capabilities and its national know-how, contributes actively to the development of European airspace protection. Its deterrence is part of this.

162) Finally, the European Intervention Initiative (EII) is the crucible for a common strategic culture and enhanced cooperation between its members. Launched in 2018, the format remains fully relevant today to support the increasing responsibility of Europeans in favour of their own security, resulting in operational commitments in which France can play the role of framework nation.

Strategic objective 7

France, a reliable sovereignty partner and credible security provider

163) France is defending an ambitious strategic offer that translates into lucid, balanced and prioritised solidarity with its partners. In a context of exacerbated polarisation and competition, France’s offer to its partners must continue to be distinguished by its high added value and enable it not to be forced into alignment or marginalisation.

1. ASSERTING ITSELF AS A LUCID PARTNER WITH HIGH ADDED VALUE

1.1 DEVELOPING AN INCLUSIVE STRATEGY IN EUROPE AND WITH THE US

164) In Europe, France must both recast its relations with its traditional partners and develop an inclusive strategy towards other countries:

• with Germany, France must deepen its relationship in order to continue to build European defence in the light of Germany’s recently expressed ambitions and the strategic and capability needs we have identified;

• Italy and Spain are key partners, both in theatres of operation (Mediterranean, Middle East, Sahel) and in terms of capability cooperation;

• with EU members, France must consolidate several of its strategic partnerships (Greece, Croatia) and, capability partnerships (Belgium) concluded recently, consolidate its links with certain partners (Quirinal Treaty with Italy, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain), and strengthen its operational cooperation on the basis of shared experiences in the Sahel and in Eastern Europe (countries involved in Operation Barkhane and Takuba TF);

• with partners in the EU neighbourhood (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia), France must, preferably, contribute to their stability by capitalising on its economic aid and European programmes to support structural reforms;

• with our allies, our space partnerships will be intensified;

• after Brexit, a constructive dialogue on the basis of the bilateral treaties must be quickly re-established with the UK.

165) With the United States, our strategic partnership will remain fundamental, and must remain ambitious, lucid and pragmatic.

1.2 CONTRIBUTING TO SECURITY IN AFRICA THROUGH BALANCED PARTNERSHIPS

166) Faced with the evolution of the terrorist threat and the growing influence of our strategic competitors across the continent, France wishes to forge renewed partnerships in Africa based on African partners’ requests and by integrating more civilian based cooperation along a security, defence, diplomacy and development continuum, as declared in the summer of 2017. They should contribute to a better understanding of security issues and build, in the long term, a stronger strategic proximity with African armies that wish to do so, particularly in view of the renegotiation of several major treaties. Coordination with our European and international partners will continue to be essential in this regard.

1.3 ADOPTING AN AMBITIOUS PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE RED SEA

167) Given the increased competition and militarisation in the Mediterranean-Red Sea continuum, France needs to strengthen its reassurance measures, support EU and NATO missions and operations, and enhance the effectiveness and level of capability cooperation with all countries in the area. The densification of certain strategic or reference partnerships will also enable France to guarantee its freedom of manoeuvre, the continuity of its supply chains and regional stability.

1.4 CONTRIBUTING TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURING FLOWS IN THE ARABIAN GULF

168) A revitalisation of France’s partnerships in the Gulf is necessary to cope with the structuring of new strategic agreements, American disengagement and the increase in regional rivalries. France must be able, with and through its partners, to hinder and counter the destabilising activities of certain regional actors and to secure its own footprint, in particular by signing security arrangements in the fields of counter-terrorism, intelligence and armaments. France must also continue to support defence and security equipment procurement projects while strengthening the fight against the diversion of war materials, the dissemination of conventional weapons and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

1.5 ENHANCING OUR ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTAINING STRATEGIC STABILITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

169) France’s role as a balancing power in the Indo-Pacific must be reaffirmed. To this end, France is committed to building partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region, notably India, Australia and Japan, as well as Indonesia and Singapore. It develops its capacities of anticipation and strategic signalling, vis-à-vis its competitors, reaffirms and strengthens its position in the politico-military multilateralism of the region, by increasing its training capacity and, if necessary, by promoting the emergence of ad hoc structures. France will also promote the implementation of the EU’s strategy for the region and its partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

2. PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE, THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE SPREAD OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

170) France defends the centrality and credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the sustainability of the four multilateral export control regimes covering chemical and biological, nuclear, ballistic and conventional weapons.

171) It is continuing to invest in the intelligence needed to hinder illicit or destabilising flows, with a particular focus on intangibles, which are particularly vulnerable to cyber actions, while developing countermeasures to CBRN threats in order to promote resilience in the face of possible attacks against its forces, interests or territory. It also strengthens its capacity for action to counteract these illicit or destabilising flows.

Strategic objective 8

Guaranteed autonomy of judgement and decision-making sovereignty

172) In an increasingly competitive and complex international context, France must focus its efforts on raising its level of knowledge, understanding of competitors or adversaries, and anticipating their intentions. This performance requirement calls for developing the agile orientation of the intelligence services while preserving the universality and effectiveness of the diplomatic and consular network. It also requires continued investment in the technological capabilities to exploit the ever-increasing volume of data, in order to share relevant information with the decision-making and action levels in a timely manner.

1. DEVELOPING AGILE INTELLIGENCE AND SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES

173) Intelligence services have to monitor, analyse and understand an increasing number of geographical areas and issues. They must anticipate crises, technological and military capability disruptions, the terrorist threat, the CBRN threat, the defence and promotion of national economic and industrial interests, in particular DTIB companies, and the fight against hybrid or transversal threats. One of the decisive challenges is to articulate the continuation of their action in the fight against terrorism and in support of military operations, with reinvestment in areas of strategic rivalry, in particular continental Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

174) The effectiveness and agility of the intelligence services depend on ambitious reforms, long-term investments and an acceleration of coordination and intelligence exchange loops, including with the armed forces in operations. The continuation of the in-depth transformations already underway — in particular the external security general directorate and the Military intelligence directorate, following the example of the international security general directorate — must be accompanied by an ambitious human resources policy in the intelligence professions, in order to attract, retain and develop a common culture and inter-service mobility. It is also essential to ensure the universality of the diplomatic network and to strengthen its means of analysis and anticipation.

2. BUILDING TECHNICAL CAPACITY

175) The preservation of French sovereignty in the face of technological change requires new investments in capabilities. The growing diversity of tools and the acceleration of technological advances offer new opportunities, provided that the necessary investments are made, according to a logic of mutualisation when the missions allow it. The reactivity of the knowledge-appreciation-anticipation function must be amplified by increased interconnection around secure communication tools, ensuring technical interoperability with the main foreign partners on a case-by-case basis, particularly within the EU and NATO.

176) The new technical tools will have to use the potential of quantum computing and artificial intelligence.

Strategic objective 9

A capacity to defend and act in hybrid fields

177) France’s main strategic competitors use hybrid strategies, deliberately ambiguous combinations of direct and indirect, military and non-military, legal and illegal, and often difficult-to-attribute modes of action. These strategies can have important consequences for democracies as they aim to delegitimise them, weaken their moral strength and cohesion or reduce their economic and national defence potential.

178) Faced with these threats and in order to defend its fundamental interests, France must perfect its organisation, be able to respond in all fields of hybridity and protect its most critical infrastructures.

1. IMPROVING OUR ORGANISATION

179) France must be capable of countering and controlling the effects of these hybrid aggressions, while respecting its principles and values. To achieve this, a more agile, responsive and integrated organisation will be adopted to identify, characterise, trigger appropriate protection mechanisms and develop responses in a more multi-sectoral approach. In line with the EU’s strategic compass and the NATO 2030 concept, France also relies on its allies and partners to benefit from leverage in its fight against hybrid threats.

180) This organisation is based on a national strategy of influence which must include the actions carried out in a global approach and over time to enhance France’s commitments but also to respond or retaliate effectively to informational manoeuvres or attacks against its interests. It mobilises its public diplomacy, particularly in Africa. A strategic communication is developed in order to convey a coherent, credible and effective message to competitors, partners or allies and to national and international public opinion. It can be coordinated with allies.

2. ACT

181) In the field of the fight against information manipulation by foreign competitors, France must have a wide range of response options, beyond public attribution, as is the case in the cyber field. France is fighting against the use of law and norms as a strategic tool (lawfare) by its competitors. It supports the adoption of European tools to combat extraterritoriality. France is developing tools to fight back against private military companies, armed groups or militias used as intermediaries — proxies — by hostile powers in order to multiply their actions of contestation or competition, while maintaining plausible deniability. Dissemination of information, national or European sanctions, legal proceedings or even military actions may target these groups if they carry out activities detrimental to French interests or if they are responsible for human rights violations and war crimes.

3. STRENGTHENING THE PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

182) In the face of hybrid threats, the protection of our critical infrastructures is a priority. Among them, underwater and space communication infrastructures require a special effort to develop the means of detection, characterisation, deterrence and even obstruction of malicious actions. Finally, France wishes to promote the development of leading French industrial players, world leaders in the field of submarine communication cables and space operations.

Strategic objective 10

Freedom of action and ability to conduct military operations, including high-intensity operations in all fields (multi-environment and multi-field)

183) The freedom of action of the forces depends on the ability to anticipate, detect and appreciate the intentions of France’s adversaries. It underpins the national capacity to show determination, to discourage hostile action or prevent the imposition of a fait accompli, and to engage in confrontation if necessary. It allows for the robust backing of nuclear forces.

184) It must be preserved from the competition phase onwards, in an ever-wider spectrum, because the strategies of France’s competitors and adversaries are expressed in a growing number of fields (outer space and cyber, seabed, electromagnetic and information fields).

185) France must maintain and further develop its capacities to decide and command, to federate and mobilise, to act and last, to invest in common spaces and to face uninhibited competitors, taking into account its interests, its place on the international scene and its global ambition, but also its means. These capacities are necessarily differentiated according to the geographical areas and common spaces considered.

1. DECIDING AND ORDERING

186) France enjoys a complete and autonomous capacity for assessment and understanding as required to support political and military decisions. The armed forces have trained and deployable command capabilities to plan, conduct and control multi-environment and multi-field operations in autonomy and in coalition when France is a framework nation at the operational level. A permanent and agile reorganized command structure controls the day-to-day and contingency operations that contribute to safeguarding its strategic interests, its metropolitan and overseas territories, its aerospace, air and sea and aeronautical approaches, and its energy supplies.

2. UNITING AND CONTRIBUTING

187) In Africa, the Near and Middle East, and the Indian Ocean, France is able to mobilise or accompany its partners, to constrain or discourage an aggressor by offering a command and support capability to the forces. It honours its commitments there.

188) In the Pacific zone, France has the means, in coordination with its partners, to discourage or hinder a competitor.

189) In Central and South America, the Arctic and Antarctic, it preserves its freedom of action, the security of its flows and its interests.

190) The armed forces are constantly working to develop and maintain interoperability with allies and partners.

3. ACT AND LAST

191) The armed forces protect the French people against a dangerous world, participate in their daily protection and contribute to the preservation of national interests. In particular, they hold permanent positions of deterrence, air safety and maritime protection and take part in missions on national territory (including DROM-COM with sovereignty forces) in addition to or in support of internal security or civil security forces.

192) The armed forces are prepared for a major engagement and ready to engage in a high-intensity confrontation, particularly in the defence of the euro-atlantic area. They are able to deploy at short notice, able to enter first, with or without possible support from allied countries. They have the capabilities to protect themselves, to last and to cope with high attrition (air superiority and fire superiority). They are able to provide an allied country with the necessary support at short notice.

193) They have diversified capabilities for deep strikes in the context of first entry, support to a coalition operation, retaliatory actions, or strategic warning. France is able to target and strike (kinetic or cyber) targets of interest.

194) Armies have the capacity to generate and aggregate effects in a networked approach from the competition phase onwards across the entire spectrum of conflict, with in particular military and civilian, public and private, institutional and individual, national or allied contributions.

4. INVESTING IN COMMON SPACES

195) France is fully present and active in preserving its freedom of action and defending its interests in common spaces that are the object of power rivalries and renewed forms of conflict.

196) Faced with strategic competitors, armies acquire and maintain their freedom of assessment and action in cyberspace.

197) In space, France maintains its national strategic autonomy in terms of situation assessment, decision-making and the conduct of operations. It ensures its access to the space environment and to assert its interests in this environment, notably through the support of its partners.

198) France has the capacity to autonomously monitor and understand actions on the seabed. By building on partnerships, it is able to discourage hostile action.

5. DEALING WITH UNINHIBITED COMPETITORS

199) The armed forces have the means of prevention, reporting and coercion to influence the strategic calculations of France’s competitors and adversaries and to win the battle of perceptions.